It's been a while...

I haven't posted in quite a while, as I've been catching up on the rest of life after the DSMs. The blogs in general are a little slower, and libnews has been completely inactive for several weeks. So, I haven't had time to comment on a lot of issues. This post is an attempt to throw out a few random thoughts; forgive me for my lack of in-depth analysis for the time being.

1) Re: the leadership race, it's completely Ignatieff and Rae. They have strength across the country, they're comfortable in both languages, they have the media attention, and they have the most support in general. Both Dion and Kennedy have an outside chance, a chance which becomes much greater if any anybody-but-Ignatieff-or-Rae movement emerges. That being said, I don't think it will, and I think most delegates will end up choosing between a relative newcomer to politics and someone with so much baggage he'd have to buy the whole airplane for storage. It'll be an interesting choice, and, I think that if Liberals act strategically in looking at their prospects in the next election, they'll ultimately support Ignatieff. If this isn't their primary concern, all bets are off.

2) Re: North Korea,...yeah, there isn't much to say, except, as I said a few weeks ago, that it's going to be an interesting little while...

3) Re: Garth Turner, I respect him much more than I respect most tories (/former tories). Although I disagree with some of his views, I like many of them, and I like his blog, and I like that he feels comfortable criticizing his party. I feel bad for him politically that he was kicked out ("suspended indefinitely), but I hope he joins the Greens, serves as their first MP, builds credibility for himself, and is re-elected in Halton in the next election. He's for the most part an intelligent man.

4) More later...

Reverse Onus for Dangerous Offenders

The Conservative government is apparently planning on introducing legislation that will reverse the onus on dangerous offender status for those convicted of three sexual or violent crimes. Up until now, the onus has been on the Crown to prove that someone should be declared a dangerous offender. Now, people convicted of three crimes in these categories will automatically be assumed to be dangerous offenders (with all that implies, including lengthier prison terms and seven years of parole ineligibility).

Now, we have that pesky notion in our legal system about being assumed innocnt until proven guilty, and I happen to think it's a good one. I think that ought to apply here too. Unfortunately, I don't think that a Charter challenge here will be successful (although similar reverse onus provisions have been struct down on Charter grounds). So my guess is that it will be up to opposition parties to stop this legislation in the political arena.

It seems to me that there are two classes of people who have committed three violent or sexual crimes: those who truly are dangerous offenders, and those who have had major extenuating circumstances and really are unlikely to reoffend. For the first class, even without this reverse onus provision, they're likely to be declared dangerous offenders as is right now. For the second class, however, they should not be considered dangerous offenders, and thus the onus should not be on them to prove that they are not dangerous offenders.

Anyways, that's my quick ramble. I think this proposal is relatively unjust and entirely pointless. Mandatory minimums I'm down with. Gun controls I'm down with. This I'm not. This will do absolutely nothing to stem violent or sexual crimes.

North Korea tests a nuclear weapon

North Korea just announced that it tested a nuclear weapon. There appear to be enough independent sources of confirmation that one can conclude that there has indeed been a nuclear test.

I for one expected North Korea to keep on bluffing in order to gain concessions but not actually test the weapon. It appears I was quite wrong.

In certain circumstances, nuclear weapons can provide a stabilizing role. If two belligerent parties both possess sufficient quantities of nuclear weapons to create a situation of mutually assured destruction, the existence of nuclear weapons can actually lessen conflict in general, because the costs of conflict are so high that all parties will attempt to avoid a potentially escalating conflict at any cost (see U.S.-Soviet relations in the 60s, 70s, and 80s for an example of this).

Unfortunately, those conditions don't apply here. Kim Jong-il isn't exactly known for being the most rational of world leaders; rather, he's known for being a reckless party animal who likes American movies.

So maybe North Korea will try to use this as another bargaining chip for further concessions. Unfortunately, it could be much worse; this will go a long ways towards giving North Korea the ability to act with complete impunity.

Prior to this announcment of NK's nuclear capability, if worst came to worst, and North Korea did something so aggregious that a U.S./SK military response was required, North Korea could begin shelling Seoul and other nearby border cities, but the damage could be limited by an all-out American air attack.

With one or more nuclear weapons, however, Kim Jong-Il can be much more dangerous. Any attempted attack on North Korea would make Kim feel like a rat in a cage, and, as people often get when cornered, he might grasp at whatever straws he has. Unfortunately, those straws now include the possibility of completely wiping out Seoul, Pusan, and, if he really feels threatened, even Tokyo.

Of course, this is the worst case scenario, which is (thankfully) unlikely to happen. But what it does mean is that it's going to awfully hard to control North Korea if it does decide to undertake a certain course of actions that the global community doesn't like. Economic sanctions haven't worked, as North Korea is perhaps the most isolated nation on the globe, and there are very few additional measures that could be taken (short of China cutting off aid) that would really give the world community leverage over it.

Now, knowing that military options are even further off the table than they were before, North Korea may be emboldened to act as it sees fit.

It's going to be an interesting few weeks...

Some Thoughts on Support for Afghanistan

There's something that I really haven't understood: why is there this general perecetion that the dominant position of the Liberal Party is that it does not support the Afghan position? Most MPs didn't vote in favour of continuing the mission (though admitedly there were other factors), and Ignatieff and Brison are seen as virtual outsiders in their support of continuing the mission. Especially in the blogs, so many people seem to be not only calling for a withdrawl from Afghanistan, but also asserting that that's the way forward for the Liberal Party. My question is, why?

Liberals began this mission. Chrétien began it; Martin continued it. Why, now that Harper is in power, would we be opposed to Afghanistan? I know that we're in opposition, but that doesn't mean opposing every single piece of legislation that comes before us. Hell, the Bloc supported over 85% of the legislation that came through the Liberal-dominated legislature when we were in government. A good idea doesn't became a bad idea just because bad guys are in support of that idea.

So, is it politics? Are we opposed to it because we think it'll bring us more votes? I really don't think so.

Support for the Afghan mission is up significantly from its low in the summer; it now sits, according to that poll, around 57% in late September. That means that only 43% of the population is against the war. But most committed NDPers (17.5% of the vote in the last election) are against the war, and they won't vote Liberal even if we advocate an immediate withdrawl. Same for the Bloc, who scored another 10.5% of the vote. Same for the Greens, who scored another 5% of the vote. Even assuming that some of the people who voted the latter two parties DO support the mission in Afghanistan, it's probably the case that of the 43% of Canadians against the war, 25-30% of them are solidly tied up in supporting other parties. What that means is that over half of Liberals support the mission in Afghanistan.

And, if you buy the arguments I (and others) have made earlier about moving to the centre-right instead of the left, there are a lot more gains to be made by supporting the war in Afghanistan than by opposing it.

In any event, this wasn't meant to be a question of whether it's objectively good that we're in Afghanistan (which I also happen to think it is). This is a question of what's good politics, and what makes sense given our (Liberals') past positions. Contrary to popular wisdom, I think both of those questions should be answered with continued support for the war.

The Continuing Cafuffles of Bob Rae

So, now we have a situation where a bunch of Rae's delegates didn't sign their form 6's personally. Instead, they were signed by (or by the direct representatives of) his B.C. campaign co-ordinator. Sketchy. And quite unkosher according to the parties rules. Yet another thing that makes us Liberals look bad...oy...

Personally, I'm going to take the same line I did with the last Volpe scandal: it's not that big a deal. What does this scandal show us?

a) There are some sketchy political organizers. Shocking.
b) There are some sketchy political organizers in the Rae campaign. Again, shocking. *eye-roll* There are a few bad apples in every bunch. I'm sure that if a political party formed by an angel that was trying to get its wings would still attract some thoroughly rotten pieces of fruit.

Does it show us that Rae himself is sketchy? No. If it is revealed that he knew anything about this prior to its actual occurence, then my tone will immediately do a complete 180. But for the time being, I'm willing to give him, like I have given much scuzzier politicians (who will remain nameless...), the benefit of the doubt.

At the same time, I can't help but be kind of happy about the hits he's taking on this. Why? I thought he should have taken a lot more flack than he actually did over his NDP donations. So, in the cosmic balancing act that is our world, I guess I net even for my desired level of Rae-bashing, because he's taking more flack for one thing than I wanted and less for another.

As a final Rae note, if it becomes even more clear that it's a two-horse race between him and Ignatieff--which it probably will be if he secures one of Brison, Dryden, or Volpe--I'll be relishing the fact that he'll finally be subjected to some of the media scrutiny that Ignatieff has faced for months. I don't deny that Ignatieff has received a lot of favourable media, but, because of his perceived front-runner status, a lot of media were quick to jump on him over virtually any little thing. Rae, on the other hand, has been largely free from this.

There was that little blip (you know, when those polls came out showing him on top...) when the media was really starting to explore him and hammer him, but so far, he hasn't received the worst of it.

In all fairness, I will note that he also has been neglected when it comes to the good stuff. I don't think most non-political-junkies really know all of Rae's accomplishments and experiences, which are certainly numerous and profound. At the same time, I don't think most Liberals know of all his links to the NDP in recent years, as well as the many time's he's slammed the Liberal Party over the years.

In short, I'm just looking forward to this being a two-horse race so that each candidate can be subjected to a lot (and I mean a lot) of media scrutiny. With 11 candidates, this was hardly possible, and even with (effectively) 4 candidates it's tough. I'm hoping it's two, so that we can realy see what everyone stands for.

On Polls' Methods, Bloggers' Methods, and other nefarious means of prediction

There's a beautiful article in today's National Post entitled "Rae, the Liberal Front-Runner?", which echoes sentiments heard in the blogosphere for a few days. The article kicks the metaphorical stuffing out of professional pollsters' predictions, such as Dryden being the leader, Rae being the leader, and Ignatieff being down in 3rd place.

By contrast, most bloggers' predictions were much more on the mark. Some were flippant guesses. Others were exceedingly well reasoned (e.g. Greg's at democraticspace.com). But virtually all of them got the basics right: Ignatieff in the lead in the high 20's; Rae, Kennedy, and Dion in the 10-20% range, not too far apart; everyone else a distant fourth. They might have got things wrong in terms of the degree (e.g. underestimating Ignatieff and Dion, overestimating Brison), but they were certainly much more correct that the professional pollsters' predictions.

Now, there's nothing wrong necessarily with the pollsters' predictions. The problem is one of interpretation. Ken Dryden may be the most popular and electable of the Liberal leadership candidates; that poll was probably completely correct. But that electability and popularity completely failed to translate into votes on the ground because it ignores reality and how the DSMs actually work.

Had the DSMs simply been a strawpoll of all Liberal members, maybe Dryden would be in the lead (and I'm not even sure of this, as I point out below). But it's not. DSMs involve having a large organizational team to identify and get the vote out, ex officios to build support, the money to send literature to your potential delegates and other voters, and more. Those are among the true measures of success at the DSMs. While candidate popularity is up there too (obviously), it's a necessary, but by no means a sufficient, condition for success.

But even if all those factors were irrelevant and it were more of a straw poll DSM, I'm still not convinced that Dryden could have come out on top. Individuals' responses in polls such as these often indicate their preference in an abstract ideal world. When push comes to shove, they might vote for a very different candidate, possibly for strategic reasons (i.e. their primary preference isn't for a candidate, it's against a candidate), possibly for perceptions of general electability, or possibly as a result of some kind of herd mentality phenomenon.

In any event, the point of the above is that while polls are useful indicators, those interpreting polls need to be careful not to attach too much significance to them or to read too much into them. Polls may show popularity, but this is only relevant for success in an election to the extent that sheer popularity is relevant.

Now, here's where I have a bone to pick with pollsters. The media and partisan bloggers will always pick up on a certain poll, for either the media value or to support their candidate, respectively. You'd expect some kind of spin or deliberate error to achieve those ends. And even if you didn't expect that, you might chalk up errors to a lack of understanding of what the polls are actually saying. But you should never expect that from professional pollsters. Insofar as some of them have used pre-DSM polling data to predict convention outcomes, they should feel ashamed of themselves, as that's just poor reasoning and use of statistics.

So, that's it for bashing pollsters and pointing out their limitations. Why did bloggers get it right?

Quite, frankly, bloggers got it right because they focused on process.

Most bloggers, in trying to determine DSM support, considered the factors which might lead to success, and came up with some formula based on these factors. These factors included membership sign-ups, ex-officio support, financial contributions, polls, and more. The weightings were somewhat arbitrary, but in the absence of PhD level research and econometric analysis, they were the best that could be expected.

Thus, the bloggers were successful because they asked, "what does it take to do well at the DSMs?", rather than just assuming it was a straight-up popularity contest.

This importance ascribed to process is something that professional pollsters and the media should pay attention to. Until they do, all the complex survey methodology, boostrapping, and asymptotic theory in the world can't save them.

Wasn't Rae supposed to win Saskatchewan? and other related questions

Now, I ask these questions with only 3/4 of the meetings reported, so of course,the results might still change such that these questions become irrelevant. So, maybe this blog is for nothing. But for now, let's assume it is.

1) Wasn't Rae supposed to be a steam-roller over Saskatchewan? As of right now (9:10PM ET), he's running 4th place, and he has only half the delegates of the front-runner Ignatieff.

2) Wasn't Dryden supposed to be a big winner in Manitoba? Granted, only 1/3 of the meetings have reported here, but he's trailing substantially behind both Rae and Ignatieff, neither of whom was reported to have the extensive network built there that Dryden has.

3) How did Kennedy do THAT poorly in Quebec?
I know his French isn't the greatest, but if Dryden can get 1.5% of the vote and Brison can get 1.2% of the vote, you'd think that Kennedy would be able to get more than 1.2%.

And as a final observation, the fact that Ignatieff is leading in Quebec by a substantial margin (38.2%, with Dion being in second with 28%) means that his foreign policy views do not make him unelectable, contrary to what many people have suggested. Having one view that many in the Liberal Party (though by not by any means all) disagree with does not make you a polarizing factor, provided you are able to build consensus in other ways, which he is.

Overestimating the little guys (and girl)

Most bloggers who made predictions about the number of delegates each candidate would receive got it, if the numbers continue in their present course, pretty much right. Kennedy was a little higher, Rae a little lower, Brison a little higher, but the overall pattern was correct.

There is, however, one major difference between the actual results and the forecast results. The divide between the top 4 and the bottom four is much larger than expected. Dryden was expected to be around 7-8% instead of 5.2%, Volpe was expected to hit 6% instead of 4.4%, Brison had high hopes of 8-9% instead of 3.8%, and even Martha Hall Findlay could realistically hope for 2-3% instead of 1%.

Meanwhile, Ignatieff was expected to be around 27% instead of 230.6%, while Rae, Dion, and Kennedy were expected to occupy the 12-16% range, not the 16.5-19% range.

What this means is that the smaller players are all but irrelevant. Sure, there are situations where the combined power of Dryden, Volpe, Brison, and MHF could exert some change, and if one even Rae, Dion, or Kennedy turn to Ignatieff, one of Dryden, Volpe, or Brison will be required to be a final kingmaker (assuming, of course, that delegates follow their leaders).

Because of these results, I wouldn't be surprised to see a few dropouts soon. Dryden and Brison, for example, might be embarassed by their poor showings and hit the road. Volpe will probably be stubborn as ever. And MHF has nothing to lose by sticking it out, so I imagine she'll hang in there. But in any event, I figure we'll lose at least one of the four over the next few weeks.

So why did the lower four get fewer delegates than expected? I don't think it's because they had less support than we expected. I'm pretty sure those blogger predictions were correct, not in terms of the number of delegates each candidate would receive, but in the number of votes. The problem is that, because of the fact that numbers of votes need to bedivided by 14 and rounded to integers, candidates will only start making their mark once they pass a certain threshold. In my riding, there were a number of candidates who received a significant number of votes that did not get a delegate spot. It's not even that uncommon for one candidate to get one fewer votes than another candidate, but the latter to get a delegate spot and the former not.

In any event, this system of rounding cuts out the marginal support that candidates have within ridings, thus shifting the totals by a few points.

In the end, it doesn't make too much diffference, but it does mean that smaller candidates' hopes of playing kingmaker may come to nothing.